In the area of the foundations of quantum mechanics a true industry appears to have developed in the last decades, with the aim of proving as many results as possible concerning what there cannot be in the quantum realm. In principle, the significance of proving 'no-go' results should consist in clarifying the fundamental structure of the theory, by pointing out a class of basic constraints that the theory itself is supposed to satisfy. In the present paper I will discuss some more recent no-go claims and I will argue against the deep significance of these results, with a two-fold strategy. First, I will consider three results concerning respectively local realism, quantum covariance and predictive power in quantum mechanics, and I will try to show how controversial the main conditions of the negative theorem turn out to be -something that strongly undermines the general relevance of these theorems. Second, I will try to discuss what I take to be a common feature of these theoretical enterprises, namely that of aiming at establishing negative results for quantum mechanics in absence of a deeper understanding of the overall ontological content and structure of the theory. I will argue that the only way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational framework -which in my view means primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about -and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing still are so in the framework.
Introduction
One of the most fascinating aspects of the twentieth-century science concerns the discovery of impossibilities in principle. Ranging from Cantor to Planck, from Church to Heisenberg, Gödel and Turing, several are the abstract entities and properties that simply cannot exist or hold in principle, whatever the intellectual resources and the time available to philosophers and scientists might be. As a matter of fact, that dealing with what does not exist is a tricky business was already clear at least since the times of the Plato's treatment of non-being, whereas the celebrated Quine's paper "On what there is" (1948) does nothing but recapitulate how difficult it is to defend a non-existence claim, especially when one gets engaged in an ontological dispute. In the area of the foundations of quantum mechanics, however, there seems not to be a similar sensitivity to how controversial a 'negative' result may turn out to be. On the contrary, a true industry appears to have developed in the last decades with the aim of proving as many results as possible concerning what there cannot be in the quantum realm.
As a matter of fact, there is a rather long sequence of so-called 'no-go' theorems that have been established along the history of quantum mechanics in the last half-century, perhaps partially inspired by the contingent circumstance that the very birth and development of quantum mechanics was based on assumptions and results exhibiting a sort of 'no-go' character (from the Planck discreteness hypothesis concerning the blackbody radiation to the Heisenberg uncertainty relations).
In principle, the significance of proving 'no-go' results should consist in a clarification of the fundamental structure of the theory, by pointing out the boundaries that the theory itself is supposed not to violate when satisfying a class of basic constraints. In fact, however, the history of the no-go theorems for quantum mechanics has been highly controversial: to cite a well-known instance, the original paper in which John S. Bell proved the theorem that bears his name contains a preliminary discussion on why the 'no-go theorems' existing at that time were far from showing what they were purported to show -namely that no hidden-variable completion of quantum mechanics was possible in principle. In spite of the controversies that such no-go industry generated, and of the intrinsic difficulty in justifying the several conditions required in the long chain of no-go theorems for quantum mechanics in the last decades, the attempt of establishing more and more stringent negative results continues to affect the imagination of many. In the present paper I will discuss some recent cases and question the significance of these results, with a two-fold strategy. First, I will consider three results concerning respectively local realism, quantum covariance and predictive power in quantum mechanics, and I will try to show how controversial the main conditions of the negative theorem turn out to be -something that appears to undermine the general relevance of these theorems. Second, I will try to discuss what I take to be a common feature of these theoretical enterprises, namely that of aiming at establishing negative results for quantum mechanics in absence of a deeper understanding of the overall ontological content and structure of the theory. I will argue that a sensible way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational frameworkwhich in my view means primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about -and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing still are so in the framework. Although clearly this is not the only way, one can try to motivate it on the basis of a 'robust' view of what a foundational view of quantum mechanics should be.
The paper is organized as follows. The sections 2-4 will be devoted to a critical analysis of three recent no-go claims, concerning respectively the role of a 'realism' condition (section 2), the status of quantum covariance (section 3) and the issue of the predictive power of quantum states (section 4); finally, in section 5, I will attempt an assessment of the no-go strategy, also connecting it with the more general issue of what it really takes to 'interpret' quantum mechanics in a philosophically sensible way. 
Models
The first instance of recent no-go theorems that we will consider concerns 'realism' (the reason for using quotation marks for the term realism will be clear soon) and is based on a widespread interpretation of the Bell theorem, according which the theorem itself proves essentially that local realism is inconsistent with quantum theory. On the basis of this formulation of the Bell theorem, the question then arises whether there might be a non-local sort of realism that could be made consistent with quantum theory. Since the work of Leggett 2003, however, a class of non-local realistic theories has been introduced in order to show that not even inflating a suitable amount of non-locality into theories that simulate quantum theory (namely, that preserve quantum predictions) can allow them to be 'realistic': for it can be shown that an inequality can be derived within the class of non-local realistic theories that is violated by quantum theory, both theoretically (Leggett 2003 ) and experimentally (Gröblacher et al. 2007 ). As a consequence -here is the no-go theorem -'realism' cannot be consistent with quantum theory, be it local (blocked by the violation of the Bell inequalities) or non-local (blocked by the violation of Leggett inequalities).
In strictly logical terms, the scope of a theorem depends on the generality of its assumptions so that, in order to assess to what extent 'realism' is really incompatible with quantum theory it is necessary to examine the very notion of realism that is adopted in establishing the above no-go result. If we do so, interestingly we discover two facts. First, the condition of 'realism' assumed in the Leggett framework is too strong. Second, the overall framework is motivated by the foundational point of view by an interpretation of the Bell theorem which is simply mistaken. Let us address the two points in turn.
Realism in the Leggett framework
In order to see why the 'realism' assumption is highly questionable in the Leggett approach, let us introduce the essential features of this framework, proposed for the first time in Leggett (2003) . As a general premise, Leggett Leggett proposes then introducing a class of non-local hidden-variable theories -namely a class of theories which, while retaining 'objectivity' (as will be seen later, it is an extra-strong assumption of realism), admits the possibility of non-local physical processes. The motivation for such a theoretical move is the following:
In my view, the point of considering such theories is not so much that they are in themselves a particularly plausible picture of physical reality, but that by investigating their consequences one may attain a deeper insight into the nature of quantum-mechanical "weirdness" which Since the Leggett-type of theory is so designed in principle as to go beyond quantum mechanics, the two parameters u and v characterize uniquely the polarization states of the photons in each pair: namely, the ensemble of the photon pairs is assumed to be the disjoint union of two subsensembles in which each member has a definite polarization. It is in this sense that it is reasonable to call the Leggett-type of theory a 'hidden-variable' theory.
L2.
Although -within a given subensemble -photon pairs can have different λ, with a statistical distribution ρ uv (λ), such distribution is assumed to be independent of the polarizer settings parameters a and b and detection processes. 
in the generalized case the corresponding expressions are
Yet, the Leggett-type of theory still preserves a weaker kind of locality assumption, according to which the averages of A and B -namely, the averages over all values of λ within each subsensemble -depend only on local parameters, namely
It is a locality assumption that makes sense to require, since a Leggett-type of theory But it is the first disjunct that must hold: we certainly cannot interpret the violation of the Leggett inequality as directed against crypto-nonlocality, since dropping this condition would make the theory a local theory, and we know from the Bell theorem that such a theory is inconsistent with quantum theory. Therefore, the real target is realism.
The problem is that, in the Leggett formulation, this sort of realism is absolutely too strong in order for this condition to be really significant and play the role that in principle the Leggett framework assigns to it. In fact the Leggett-sort of realism, by assuming that quantum systems have pre-existing and measurement-independent properties, turns out to be incompatible with quantum theory quite independently from any derivation of inequalities, so that the violation of certain inequalities by a non-local 'realistic' theory of the Leggett class can hardly tell against the consistency of any form of realism in the quantum realm. The
Leggett realism turns out to be an unreasonable assumption of any allegedly 'objective' theory of quantum phenomena in a way that closely resembles all existing no-hidden variable theories proofs of the 60's (Gleason, Jauch-Piron, Kochen-Specker and an additional proof provided by Bell himself as a simplified version of the Kochen-Specker theorem): as shown 2 As a matter of fact, the Leggett-type of theories are 'realistic' hidden variable theories that are assumed to be non-local by accepting the condition usually called outcome independence but dropping the further condition called parameter independence (according to the Shimony revision of the terminology introduced in Jarrett 1984: see my Laudisa 2008 for details). I wish also to stress that in presenting the Leggett framework I skip several technical details that, although deserving attention, are inessential to the present discussion.
already by Bell himself in the article that preceded the Bell theorem article, although it was published after it (Bell 1966 ), all these proofs required assumptions that it was not reasonable to require from any hypothetical completion of quantum theory 3 , and it is no surprise that the Bohmian theory -namely the only serious existing 'hidden variable' theory -need not satisfy any of these assumptions (in fact, it violates them). As Bell remarked:
It will be urged that these analyses [i.e. the above mentioned proofs] leave the real question untouched. In fact it will be seen that these demonstrations require from the hypothetical view of the emergence of phenomena that were not easy to accommodate within a classicallyinspired view of the physical world, non-locality being the most urgent case. Due to the unavoidable existence of entangled states -something that makes quantum mechanics a nonlocal theory in a fundamental sense (due to the linearity of the theory, of which entanglement is a consequence) -it has seemed plausible to put things in the following way: let us ask whether quantum mechanics might be seen as a 'fragment' of a more general theory whichat a 'higher' level -may recover that locality that turns out not to hold at the strictly quantum level. One of the strong points of the original Bell strategy that led to the Bell-named theorem was exactly that this hypothetical extension was confined to the locality/non-locality issue and needed not say anything on further details concerning 'realistic' or 'non-realistic' properties, states or whatever: in addition to being useful for the economy of the theorem, this point was absolutely plausible since it makes sense to require from the extension the only condition that we are interested to add to the new hypothetical super-theory, namely locality.
In the Leggett case, things are different. A minimum of locality is preserved in the extension, but in addition a condition concerning the definiteness (Leggett 2003) or the partial definiteness (Branciard et al. 2008) is required: standard quantum mechanics, however, has nothing to say on these conditions precisely because its way of describing the states of investigated systems is in strong tension with this sort of definiteness, be it total or partial. If this is the case, the sort of plausibility that was inherent in requiring locality from the theory that was supposed to extend quantum mechanics is absent, since it is unclear what insight would we gain in having a super-theory that is slightly more non-local than any theory ruled out by the Bell theorem but that requires definite (or semi-definite) properties that standard quantum mechanics sees no reason to require anyway.
The interpretation of the Bell theorem in the Leggett framework
The second point is that the strategy leading to the no-go theorem against realism is based on a wrong interpretation of the Bell theorem in the first place, that undermines the whole project. The latter assumes in fact that the Bell theorem has among its assumptions both locality and realism, whereas it is easy to check that in the usual framework -namely, in the EPR setting with strict spin anticorrelation -the very existence of definite properties (call them 'hidden variables', 'pre-existent properties', 'objective properties', 'classical properties' or whatever) is a consequence of the locality assumption. Since in the EPR setting the distant spin outcomes turn out to be anticorrelated, if we require the theory to be local then it cannot be the case that the anticorrelation is explained by the measurement procedure on one side affecting the outcome at the other, far away side. Therefore, the only reasonable explanation of the distant spin outcomes being anticorrelated is that there are definite values for the spins already at the source: due to the logical structure of the argument, the only independent assumption is undoubtedly locality. But also in the more general EPR setting with non-strict spin anticorrelation, the so-called stochastic hidden-variable theories' framework (originally introduced in Bell 1971 and Clauser, Horne 1974), no independent 'realism' assumption plays any role although, once again, conventional wisdom tries its best to include it in the set of the Bell theorem's conditions. In the stochastic hidden-variable theories' framework (we will refer to the BCH framework, since this was originally introduced in Bell 1971 and Clauser, Horne 1974), a typical EPR joint system S 1 +S 2 is prepared at a source, so that a 'completion' parameter λ is associated with the single and joint detection counts. Suppose we denote by a and b respectively the setting parameters concerning two detectors, located at space-like separation and devised to register the arrival of S 1 and S 2 respectively. The model then is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
BCH1 The parameter λ is distributed according to a function ρ(λ) that does not depend either on a or on b.
BCH2
The parameter λ prescribes single and joint detection probability.
BCH3
Locality holds, namely the λ-induced probability for the measurement outcomes for S 1 and S 2 separately is such that (i) the detection probability for S 1 depends only on λ and a, (ii) the detection probability for S 2 depends only on λ and b, (iii) and the joint detection probability is simply the product of the detection probability for S 1 and the detection probability for S 2 .
What Bell is interested to in this context is a joint probability distribution P is meant to indicate that the value at A is ± 1 provided that the setting at A is m and the setting at B is n. This is equivalent to the assumption that a joint probability distribution P (A 1,1 , A 1,2 , A 2,1 , A 2,2 ; B 1,1 , B 1,2 , B 2,1 , B 2,2 ) always exists. What does the point seem to be about realism, then? The point seems to be the assumption that realism is equivalent to the existence of the joint probability distribution
LOCALITY -
But one thing is to define what realism amounts to, and quite another one to assume that the definition is actually satisfied: I can well define what a winged horse is supposed to be, without being able to prove that such a thing exists in the world! As a matter of fact, in the above model the characterization of REALISM as the existence of a suitable joint probability distribution does not imply by itself that such a distribution exists: it is exactly LOCALITY that imposes on the form of the distribution the very constraint we need in order to be sure that the desired joint probability distribution actually exists. For let us assume that the theory is local. as marginals, since P(A n & B m ) = P(A n ) P(B m ), with n, m = 1,2. Also in this framework, that is, realism is justified by locality which turns out then to be the real culprit.
The overall philosophical lesson that we can learn from the above discussion is twofold.
First, it seems pointless to launch a no-go anathema against realism by 'inflating' an a priori notion of realism (in terms of pre-existing properties) into quantum theory, only to discover that quantum theory itself cannot possibly host that notion no matter whether it is local or not! Second, if this sort of realism is inconsistent with quantum theory from scratch, it makes little sense to require it from any hypothetical local extension of quantum theory, since the latter might be ruled out due to the unreasonable 'realism' assumption. On these grounds the derivation of the Leggett inequalities, then, can hardly have the status of a serious 'no-go theorem', so that we can safely claim that the question is open whether realism can still play a conceptual role in the philosophical foundations of quantum theory.
A No-Go Theorem about Quantum Covariance: The Gisin Models
A second case study is provided by a recent no-go claim according to which it is impossible in principle to construct a deterministic nonlocal hidden variable extension of quantum theory that satisfies a particular covariance requirement (Gisin 2011) . According to (a correct reading of) the Bell theorem, we know from that no (deterministic or stochastic) extension of quantum theory -be it a hidden variable theory or not 5 -can be local; we may still ask, however, whether there exists some sort of deterministic nonlocal (hidden variable) extension with different properties, in particular with respect to relativistic covariance. In his recent paper, Gisin shows that no such extension is possible if we require that the extended theory be covariant, namely no such extension can account for quantum correlations in the sense of relativistic time-order-invariant predictions (namely under the change of time ordering).
The framework is a typical Bell experimental setting, with the emission of pairs of spin-1/2 particles prepared at the source in the spin singlet state ψ (−) . In this ideal setting the source state of the joint system prescribes a strict anticorrelation between the measurement outcomes in the two wings of the experimental setting, whereas the measurement outcomes were supposed to be associated with spacetime regions that are space-like separated. According to the usual terminology, we will call Alice and Bob the two parties involved in the two distant kinds of measurements. Since the two measurement regions are space-like separated, there will be frames F in which Alice precedes Bob (in the F-time-ordering) in choosing her setting parameter a and frames F′ in which such time ordering is reversed, so that Bob is first in choosing his setting parameter b. In addition to this, the Gisin model assumes a so-called 'nonlocal' variable λ, which is supposed to determine the measurement result.
Suppose now that Alice chooses first her setting a: her measurement result α can be expressed as a function of the initial state of the composite system ψ
, of the setting parameter a and of the nonlocal variable λ, namely
, a, λ)
whereas the measurement result for Bob, who chooses his setting b after, can be expressed as a function of the initial state of the composite system ψ , a, b, λ).
(Clearly the letters 'F' and 'S' denote who was the first and who the second in choosing the setting.) Gisin stresses that the model is assumed to be 'non-local' exactly because Bob's result might depend also on a, in addition to b: "this is the sense in which the variable λ together with the functions F AB and S AB form a nonlocal model" (our emphasis). If we consider the reverse time order, in which it is Bob who chooses first, we will have
and
where the functions F BA and S BA need not coincide with the functions F AB and S AB , respectively, due to the different time order. Now a covariance condition is required from such a nonlocal model, namely the condition according to which Alice's result, being a scalar, should be independent of the reference frame. Hence we obtain for α and β
, a, b, λ)
, a, b, λ) from which we derive that (5) makes the 'Bob-first' model a local model, whereas (6) , a, λ) -which was local at the beginning! -then it is not covariance that must be blamed for the model becoming local, but rather the fact that λ is just named 'nonlocal' but works from the beginning as a local variable.
Let us even suppose that this awkward feature can be justified by the idea that a measurement that comes first cannot depend on a choice that has yet to be then the model is already assumed to be local and there is no point to require it to be covariant, since it cannot work anyway. But if we write instead
, a, b, λ) then we should have, by Covariance, that
The model, then, seems local or non-local according to the frame of reference: in turn, this makes unclear the idea that Covariance turns a clearly nonlocal model into a clearly local model.
A No-Go Theorem about the Predictive Power of Quantum Theory: the

Colbeck-Renner 'Free' Models
In a recent paper, Colbeck and Renner establish a further no-go result, concerning the predictive power of quantum theory (Colbeck, Renner 2011). As is well known, quantum theory is an indeterministic theory in a precise sense: given a quantum system S in the state ρ and a physical quantity Q measurable on S, the state ρ does not determine in general the outcome of the measurement but provides only the probability of recording one of the possible outcomes with a certain probability. Since there is no available proof that this represents the maximal possible amount of information that can be gathered from a quantum . Intuitively, a SV at a given spacetime point (t, r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) is to be interpreted simply as a value that is accessible at (t, r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ), so that a measurement process in this context is just a process that takes an input A to an output X, where both A and X are SV's. According to Colbeck and Renner, the assumption FR is nothing but the assumption that we can always select a SV A as the input of a measurement process such that all the other SV lying outside the future lightcone turn out to have no correlation with A. The second (uncontroversial) assumption is the validity of QM.
On the basis of these assumption 8 , Colbeck and Renner show the following. If we denote with A a measurement setting and with X the measurement outcome, we know that quantum theory describes both A and X in such a way as to generate a probability distribution P A/X of the possible outcomes X for any given A. Should this distribution be not informationally maximal, there should be some further information Ξ that, 'added' somehow to the information encoded in the distribution, is supposed to improve the precision in the prediction of the outcome. What Colbeck and Renner prove is essentially that Ξ is irrelevant: the distribution P A+ Ξ/X , namely the distribution of X given A plus the additional information Ξ, is equal to the former distribution P A/X , so that Ξ does not seem contribute to improve the predictive power associated to the standard quantum distribution (Colbeck, Renner 2011, p.
3).
The framework in which this result is obtained is intentionally formulated in a very general way for at least two reasons: first, in order to encompass the most general possible analysis of a measurement process in quantum theory and, second, to envisage the most general possible framework "within which any arbitrary extra information provided by an extension of the current theory can be considered" (Colbeck, Renner 2011, p. 2) . In this very general framework, however, the hypothetical additional information Ξ is supposed to satisfy a pair of assumptions that are innocuous only at first sight. Although Colbeck and Renner state explicitly of Ξ that "we do not assume that it is encoded in a classical system but, instead, we characterize it by how it behaves when observed" (Colbeck, Renner 2011, p. 3) , they require that such informational entity is such that (i) we can have access to it at any time;
(ii) it is static, namely that its behavior does not depend on where or when it is observed.
In order to evaluate the relevance of the Colbeck-Renner result, we may again wonder whether the alleged generality of their model is really a virtue. The opposite seems to be the case and we can realize it by taking into account what appears to be the only serious candidate for being an informationally finer version of QM, namely Bohmian mechanics 9 . The latter 8 We put technical details aside, but the interested reader may consult the Supplementary Information attached to the main paper, which is presented in a rather qualitative form. 9 We wish to stress that we refer to Bohmian mechanics for exemplifying and explanatory reasons, without claiming any apriori superiority for it with respect to competing views on the foundations of quantum starts from the assumption that the ordinary quantum wave function need not be complete -in itself a perfectly plausible and consistent assumption to make -and adds a further element in order to complement the informational role of the wave function itself, namely the particle mechanics. True, we feel that the Bohmian framework is able to address foundational issues with a clarity and crispness that are often rare in current debates but this has to do with a personal -as such, highly debatablephilosophical taste. 10 A last critical remark. The authors claim that FR involves the lightcone structure of the relativity theory just to provide a meaning to the idea of spacetime random variable, and "does not involve any assumptions about relativity theory" (p. 2). First, assuming the lightcone structure is basically assuming relativity theory. Second, taking seriously the fact that the spacetime which is the arena of quantum measurements is at least a specialrelativistic spacetime is essential in several respects: otherwise awkward properties would hold for QM, first of all signalling across distant regions since in a non-relativistic spacetime no limit to the travel of information can be postulated.
.
The No-Go Strategy: what's basically wrong with it?
As we have seen, the supporters of the no-go strategy usually assume the extreme generality of their models as a virtue: we do not need to enter in too many details -they would probably argue -in order to show that we cannot extend orthodox quantum theory into a theory of quantum phenomena that preserves properties that some might like to retain -be they locality, realism, covariance or predictive power. The main point of the present paper is that that generality, far from being a virtue, is rather the opposite. It is exactly their being abstract and detached from the actual alternatives to quantum theory that deprives the proposed models proposed by the no-go strategies of a deeper significance. Not only do all these results take ordinary quantum theory itself at face value, so that the extending theories are supposed to inherit all the vagueness implicit in the orthodox treatment of the basic notions of ordinary quantum mechanics (clearly, the most urgent vagueness being the meaning of the wave function). But also the no-go results that we have discussed above, although addressing different issues, display an underlying common feature, that of avoiding any reference to a more detailed conceptual structure of the hypothetical theory that should extend or replace ordinary quantum theory.
In the case of the Leggett-type of theories, an extra-strong kind of 'realism' is simply imposed from outside, without any regard to the sort of much more sophisticated kind of realism that can happily survive in different, more hospitable frameworks (such as Bohmian mechanics or GRW theories). In the case of the Gisin model, proving that no deterministic non-local hidden variable extensions of QM can be covariant conveys no useful information on the inner structure and character of any of these extensions. Once again the case of Bohmian mechanics can help. This theory is a non-local deterministic hidden variable theory which is endowed with a structure that does justify its failure in satisfying covariance: as soon as the theory is required to describe a system of n particles, the guiding equation refers to a unique, absolute time for all n particles, a circumstance that makes the description a non-Lorentz invariant one. This justification makes the non-covariance of Bohmian mechanics remarkably more relevant and instructive from a foundational point of view, since its nonLorentz invariance is deeply connected with the overall structure of the theory itself. As to the Colbeck-Renner result, the situation is even more striking, since a focus on the issue of finding a theory that might be interpreted as 'informationally finer' compared to QM should have led naturally toward a fair assessment of such a theory as Bohmian mechanics but, ironically enough, that theory just happens not to satisfy at least one of the main conditions under which the Colbeck-Renner result is established.
A more general remark concerning the no-go strategy is in order, a remark connected with one of the hottest issues under debate since the birth of the ordinary formulation of QM in the Thirties, namely the measurement problem. Unless one disagrees on the idea that there is just one physical world -which is the (logically consistent) option pursued by the many-worlds
interpretation -the measurement problem shows that the coupling between system and apparatus that ordinary QM prescribes gives rise to a physical situation that simply does not match with what we observe in the laboratory, unless we add some rules of thumb like the reduction of the wave function. The measurement problem is only the clearest sign of a fundamental fact: if we require from such a theory as QM something more than just predicting statistical patterns -something like answering the question: what would be the world like, should QM be (approximately) true? -then we have learned from decades of foundational debates that QM must be supplemented with additional structure, rather than deprived of it. Clearly, it is very hard to agree on many deep questions that this fundamental fact raises: What should this additional structure be like and how should it be interpreted?
Should it necessarily entail new experiments and/or new predictions or a better understanding of the theory's structure should be considered already a progress? Nevertheless, in view of the above discussed problems with the no-go philosophy, I argue that the only way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational framework -which in my view means primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about -and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing are still so in the framework. True, the question concerning the meaning of 'interpretational framework' admits different answers but I think we can still subscribe to the position of Richard Healey who, yet in his The search for negative results of a general sort seems to hide the implicit tendency to avoid or postpone the really hard job: the attempt to interpret quantum mechanics according to a foundationally robust sense of 'interpretation', namely the attempt to make sense of it within a scientific image of the world in which we strive to understand what nature is and not what our theorizing is forced to be silent on 12 .
